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THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST IN COURT
MARVIN E. WOLFGANG*
Every profession has its own conflicts of inter-
ests, ethical issues and relativities. As a sociologist
and, more particularly, as a criminologist, I have
encountered a few. Although they were not ex-
cessively troublesome and may not even have
bothered some of my colleagues, they nevertheless
did cause me to be cautious. Among such en-
counters were those related to my role as a social
scientist testifying as an "expert witness" for civil
rights causes.
My experiences began in 1965 with the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. I gave
my first testimony in Federal District Court in
Little Rock, Arkansas, in connection with the fam-
ous case. of Maxwell v. Bishop,' which was later
pursued through the United States Supreme Court.
Long and elaborate depositions in Louisiana,
Florida, South Carolina, Alabama and Georgia
followed, all dealing with blacks who, like Maxwell,
had been convicted of rape and sentenced to death.
My last major court experience was as a witness in
Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.2 in Los Angeles in
1970, a case involving denial of a job because of a
"substantial" arrest record. The case was handled
through the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission.
I am a sociologist and criminologist, opposed to
the death penalty, in favor of equality of oppor-
tunities and opposed to discrimination, whether
on the street, in the factory, or in the courts. As a
citizen and as a professor with a social conscience,
I should, on the surface, experience no conflict
serving as an expert witness on behalf of defendants
or organizations representing such defendants.
These individuals are, after all, in a posture of dis-
advantage. They are products of socially disgrace-
ful ways of being treated as minority members of
society.
Nevertheless, problems did arise from the very
fact that these were worthy causes to which I had
long been devoted and about which I did feel
keenly. Had they not been issues that attracted my
* Professor of Sociology and Law, Center for Studies
in Criminology and Criminal Law, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966).
2316 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Cal. 1970).
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social senses, the problems of personal versus pro-
fessional perspectives, and of internal scientific data
analysis, would not have arisen. For example, I was
once requested by the National Rifle Association
to undertake research on their behalf; I had no
difficulty rejecting what amounted to a very lucra-
tive offer. Being opposed to civilian gun ownership
and in favor of very restrictive gun control legisla-
tion, I encountered no difficulty rejecting research
with an organization that represented the most
powerful lobby in favor of private possession of
firearms.
The problems I faced as a social scientist working
within the framework of social causes that I sup-
ported were connected with the following: (a)
science versus advocacy, (b) research design, (c)
display and suppression of empirical data, (d) style
of testimony, (e) interpretation of findings, and (f)
vulnerability of scientific inquiry. None of these
was a new or esoteric issue, but when the social
scientist steps into the arena of adversary games,
confronts role conflicts, and subjects the presenta-
tion of research to the cross-examination of his
mind, he faces problems in the drama that are
different from those described in textbooks. He
meets challenges different from those presented by
his own colleagues and students in professional
articles and university seminars. A description of
the research issues, designs and analyses in which
I participated will illustrate some of the problems
to which I refer.
During the summer of 1965, I embarked upon
research to examine in detail the relationship be-
tween race and sentencing for rape in eleven
Southern and border states in which rape was a
capital offense. The study was requested and spon-
sored by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and
conducted by the Center for Studies in Criminology
and Criminal Law at the University of Pennsyl-
vania. Professor Anthony Amsterdam and I were
co-directors of the study.
At each step in the development and imple-
mentation of the research design, from the selection
of the sample to the analysis of the data, emphasis
was on the use of research criteria that would in-
crease the reliability and objectivity of the data
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while minimizing sources of bias and subjectivity.
These are, after all, basic principles of scientific
research methodology. The purpose of the research
was to examine the extent to which race discrimina-
tion functions in the judicial system, at least with
respect to sentencing decisions, and to provide
source data for possible subsequent litigation.
The research findings were presented as evidence
in six states to support petitioners' claims of racial
discrimination in the administration of the death
penalty. They were, in part, included in testimony
in Maxwell before the Federal District Court in
1966, and later offered to the United States Su-
preme Court. They were also part of the testimony
offered in 1972 before the Subcommittee of the
United States House of Representatives, which was
considering bills both to suspend the death penalty
for two years, and to abolish it completely.
Because most executions for rape during the past
thirty years had occurred in twelve states, we de-
cided that the study could be profitably confined
to them, even though six other states allowed the
imposition of the death penalty for rape. In order
to provide an empirical basis for conclusions about
the effect of racial and nonracial factors on capital
sentencing for rape, it was necessary to gather data
relating to a substantial number of rape cases in
each State. Moreover, a sufficiently long period of
time covered by the research was necessary in order
to satisfy the notion of "custom," i.e., an institu-
tionalized, systematic, judicial norm of sentencing
behavior. This is the reason that a twenty-year
period, 1945 to 1965, was used.
It was nearly impossible to collect data on every
case that occurred. The demands of proper statisti-
cal analysis required that cases be examined in a
proper sampling procedure. Standard statistical
sampling techniques were therefore employed. For
each of the states, a random, stratified sample of
counties was chosen to represent the urban-rural
and black-white demographic distributions. The
counties chosen comprised more than 50 per cent
of the total population of the twelve states. Every
case of conviction for rape, from January 1, 1945
to the summer of 1965, was recorded. Data were
gathered for a twenty-year period for over 3000
rape convictions in 230 counties in eleven states.
(Maryland was not covered because of time limits.)
These states were those that most often executed
persons for rape, and which also displayed an ap-
parent racial disparity, in that blacks were more
frequently executed than whites. In order to ex-
plore the meaning of this apparent racial disparity
in capital sentencing, only rape convictions were
considered.
It might be asserted that blacks commit rape
more frequently than whites, are more frequently
arrested, or are more frequently prosecuted.
Whether these or any combinations of these asser-
tions are true was not questioned in this study,
mainly because data were not readily available to
test such assertions. Instead, the focus was on the
reliable and objectively ascertainable fact that de-
fendants had been convicted for the crime of rape.
Using this focal point meant that the effect of racial
factors on the criminal process prior to conviction
could not be explored. Thus, even if blacks were
disproportionately sentenced to death for rape,
there was no way of knowing whether the pattern
could be accounted for by a disproportionate fre-
quency in the commission of rape by blacks, or by
a disproportionate frequency in the conviction of
blacks for rape. However, among convicted de-
fendants, it was possible to determine whether
black defendants were disproportionately fre-
quently sentenced to death, and, if so, whether the
disproportion could be explained by nonracial
variables.
This research, therefore, concentrated on convic-
tions rather than on an earlier stage in the process-
ing of suspects or defendants, partly because of the
need to conduct the research with dispatch for
litigation purposes (after all, people were sitting
in death rows all across the country awaiting exe-
cution), and partly because good empirical data
prior to conviction were not readily available. We
decided to refrain from trying to make assertions
about discriminatory behavior of the police or
prosecutors in arresting or prosecuting more blacks
than whites. Feelings, sentiments, intuition and
anecdotes are not the kernel of scientific research.
They may stimulate research inquiry and produce
heuristic insights to guide hypothesis formation,
but they cannot provide empirical quantitative
evidence that can boldly and rigorously withstand
cross-examination. Hence, no effort was made to
determine whether there was discrimination i the
processing of suspects and defendants prior to the
determination of guilt. To maintain the capacity
to provide statistical material in the traditions of
scientific inquiry, we accepted the adjudication of
guilt for defendants who had been charged with
forcible rape. In no way were we prepared to ques-
tion the adjudication of guilt, however strong may
have been our suspicions about the adjudication
process. The base line, then, of data collection was
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all convictions for rape in the eleven Southern
states.
In order to explore the effect of racial as well as
nonracial variables on the imposition of the death
penalty, we sought to determine which variables
could be obtained from the county records of rape
convictions. In addition to collecting information
on the race of both the defendant and the victim,
and on the type of sentence, we gathered informa-
tion about many nonracial variables that could be
construed as mitigating or aggravating circum-
stances. If standards were sought for sentencing in
capital cases, some nonracial variables might have
had a telling effect. The following variables were
included in the study: (1) offender characteristics:
age, marital status, prior criminal record, previous
employment and employment status; (2) victim
characteristics: age, marital status, dependent
children, prior criminal record and reputation for
chastity; (3) nature of relations between the vic-
tim and the offender: whether the offender was
known to victim and whether there had been prior
sexual relations; (4) circumstances of the offense:
whether it was a contemporaneous offense, the type
of entry (authorized or unauthorized), the location
of offense (indoor or outdoor), whether there was a
display of a weapon, whether a weapon was carried,
the amount of injury to the victim, whether there
was a threat made to the victim, the degree of force
employed, whether the victim was made pregnant
by the offense, whether the offender was acting
alone or in concert and the date of offense; (5) the
circumstances of the trial: the plea, whether there
was a defense of insanity, whether counsel was ap-
pointed or retained, the length of time of the trial,
whether there was a defense of consent and whether
the defendant testified.
A twenty-eight page research schedule was con-
structed to obtain uniform data from records of
widely varying quality and geographically dis-
persed locations. To reduce the amount of sub-
jective or judgmental variation recorded by field
investigators, each variable was described in a
manner that focused the investigator's attention
on objective facts or quantities that could be re-
corded on a check list.
Some information, including that about race and
type of plea, was unambiguous and offered little
difficulty in establishing accuracy. More diffi-
culty occurred in trying to obtain reliable, ob-
jective data for items such as "injuries sustained
by victim." To make reliable comparisons from
case to case, a check-list of categories of pre-
described injuries was developed, using. brief
phrases that .focused the recorder's attention on
specific, significant, objective details, and upon the
consequences of injuries. For example, categories
for the latter item included recording whether the
victim suffered "minor injury requiring no medical
treatment;" suffered "physical injuries requiring
medical treatment, but not requiring hospitaliza-
tion;" or suffered "physical injuries requiring hos-
pitalization."
Thirty law students were recruited from across
the country to serve as field investigators. This is a
critical point. The social science researcher-has a
fear of his being captured subtly and, perhaps even
unconsciously, by the desire to prove his case, to
show the kinds of evidence he believes and wants
to believe exist. Therefore, it was extremely im-
portant that the field investigators be carefully
prepared to recognize their own potential biases.
As a supervisor, my task was to exercise as much
quality control over the collection and recording of
data as was possible. Before going into the field, the
students were given a two-day orientation by Pro-
fessor Amsterdam and myself. The instruction
process outlined in detail the research design and
the legal components of the task. Emphasis was
placed on the importance of providing reliable'data,
founded upon uniformity in observing and record-
ing data. We emphasized particularly that the in-
vestigators should not let their personal assump-
tions about the probable results of the study in-
fluence the manner in which they recorded the
data. The field investigators were instructed to call
central personnel for advice if instances arose in
which they had trouble classifying their observa-
tions while in the field. After completion of the
field work, schedules were forwarded to the Center
for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law for
coding and statistical analysis.
To determine whether the death penalty wis
given with disproportionate frequency to blacks,
we employed the null hypothesis and the chi-square
(X 2) statistical test, for which P less than 0.05 was
chosen as the level of significance. Two major null
hypotheses were proposed. The first was as follows:
Among all defendants convicted of rape, there is
no significant association between the race of the
defendant and the type of sentence. The second
was stated thusly: Among all defendants convicted
of rape, there are no significant differences between
the proportions of black defendants with white vic-
tims, and all other classes of rape defendants
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sentenced to death. Both of these hypotheses were
rejected in each state analyzed.
The data were compiled from seven states-
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
South Carolina and Tennessee-in order to prepare
testimony for use in litigation being conducted by
the Legal Defense Fund. Each state was separately
reviewed. However, the findings and conclusions
were uniform in all states. No attempt will be made
here to review the statistical data. Such analyses
have been presented elsewhere.3 Suffice it to say
that black defendants whose victims were white
were sentenced to death approximately eighteen
times more frequently than defendants in any other
racial combination of defendant and victim. The
probability of such a relationship between the sen-
tence of death and black defendants with white
victims was, by chance alone, less than one out of
a thousand. The statistical probabilities were not
as high in Arkansas, but nonetheless were com-
pelling and significant in the language of the statis-
ticians. As Michael Meltsner reported in his recent
book,. Cruel and Unusual,4 about my testimony in
the Maxwell case in Arkansas:
[... the disparity between the number of death
sentences imposed on Negroes with white victims
and all other racial combinations of convicted de-
fendants and victims was such that it could have
occurred less than twice in 100 times by chance.]
Put another way, if race were not related to cap-
ital sentencing in Arkansas, the results observed
in the twenty-year period study could have oc-
curred fortuitously in two (or less) twenty-year
periods since the birth of Christ. He believed that
the study documented racial discrimination that
previously available data-not collected system-
atically or in a form permitting rigorous analysis-
could only suggest. With a qualification that "in-
formation is always limited," Wolfgang concluded
that the study had made definite what before had
been merely suspected. 5
My scientific orientation and training con-
fronted my social consciousness as I performed the
research and offered testimony in Little Rock. I
had to be cautious in my choice of language in order
to imbue my conclusions with precision, accuracy
and validity. I drew particular attention to the
distinction between "differential" sentencing, "dis-
3 See Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion,
and the Death Penalty, in BLAcKs AND THE LAW (J.
Greenberg ed. 1973).
4 M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, THE Su-
PRrEM COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
6 Id. at 100-01.
proportionate" sentencing and "discriminatory"
sentencing. My friends at the Legal Defense Fund
who are attorneys, and who schooled me in the
process of direct and cross-examination, had to
be schooled themselves in the reluctance of a re-
searcher to leap too quickly to a conclusion of dis-
crimination, which was the conclusion desired by
the adversaries in seeking to obtain a judicial de-
cision favorable to their cause. Meltsner described
this process:
[Hie had no experience in testifying about so-
ciological matters in court. Indeed, this was one
of the many reasons that the lawyers thought that
he would be an extremely effective witness-here
was no "expert" witness for hire.... Although
his testimony should not appear canned, Wolfgang
did have to know precisely how the lawyer ques-
tioning him intended to bring out the purpose and
results of the rape study. He also had to learn what
he might expect on cross-examination.... Long
before Maxwell's second habeas petition was filed,
Wolfgang's schooling as a witness had been at-
tended to, for [Norman] Amaker and I had travelled
to Philadelphia to help him prepare. We wrote out
long lists of questions, and posed them to Wolfgang.
After he responded, we discussed his answer-had
a word of jargon crept in? would the judge under-
stand a particular scientific concept?-and then
moved on. It was tedious work for all concerned,
but we knew that the best stories told in court had
generally been told in lawyers' offices first.6
One of these stories had to do with the distinc-
tions between "differential," "disproportionate"
and "discriminatory." I vividly remember the long
discussions that Amaker, Meltsner, Amsterdam
and I had on several occasions as we were preparing
my testimony. Amaker, a black lawyer working
full-time with the Legal Defense Fund, and one of
the brilliant minds that engineered the entrance
of my testimony, was particularly intent on using,
as early as possible, the word "discrimination" in
the testimony. Amsterdam, who was a bit more
patient, a patience perhaps partly borne from his
deep involvement in construction of the twenty-
eight page schedule for interview purposes and in
research design, appreciated my reluctance to leap
from a priori intuitive assumption of discrimina-
tion to the conclusion of discrimination. As I labori-
ously indicated to all of the lawyers, despite the
elaborate nature of the information we had con-
cerning the victim, the offender, the character of
IId. at 98.
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the offense and the judicial proceedings, we had no
direct evidence of discrimination.
"Discrimination" refers to behavior that resides
in the mind of the actor which is expressed overtly
for observation by others. I tried to impress upon
the lawyers that I was uncomfortable using the
term "discrimination" until all of the evidence was
documented, that even if the findings were in ac-
cord with their adversary position, I could not use
the term in the null hypothesis, nor in the descrip-
tion of the research, until the final statement. The
final statement asserted that there was a dispro-
portionate sentencing of blacks to the death penalty
in comparison with whites. This meant a differen-
tial sentencing pattern over the twenty-year period.
'Differential" meant a degree of statistical differ-
ence that was significant according to traditional
probability statistics. Professor John de Cani has
carefully and dearly described what those proba-
bility statistics mean in the language of statisti-
cians.7 Differential sentencing, i.e., disproportion-
ate frequency of blacks sentenced to death in
comparison to whites, could mean only inferen-
tially that there was a pattern of discrimination.
I felt secure as a social scientist in asserting in court
and in depositions that so clearly differential and
disproportionate had been the sentencing that
there was historically a pattern of discrimination in
the imposition of the death penalty.
It was my belief then, and it is my continued
belief, that by exercising scientific caution in the
style of expressing research findings, the social
scientist retains his integrity as a scientist, and, at
the same time, can produce compelling, persuasive,
convincing and rigorous testimony as an expert
witness.
I often wondered what would have been my
stance if the research data over a twenty-year pe-
riod of sentencing in the eleven Southern states had
yielded results opposite those that we found. That
is, suppose most of the nonracial factors we had
examined in the conviction of rape and the imposi-
tion of the death penalty had shown that blacks
had committed more aggravated rape; had, in
greater frequency than whites, prior criminal rec-
ords; had inflicted greater injury; had committed
more corollary offenses such as burglary and rob-
bery; had more frequently impregnated the vic-
tim, etc. As I indicated earlier, none of these non-
racial variables was in any way related to race, and
7 See, de Cani, The Role of the Statistician in Jury
Discrimination Cases, 65 1. CRt. L. & C. 234 (1974).
the differential sentencing pattern we observed,
with more blacks sentenced to death than whites,
occurred only when the defendant was black and
the victim was white. If the nonracial factors had
been related to black defendants, I suppose the
lawyers from the Legal Defense Fund would have
used some other tactic and not presented our stud-
ies. Under those circumstances, I probably would
not have been an expert witness.
I was aware of this situation before the data had
been collected and analyzed, and was prepared for
the possibility that I might not testify. However,
had I not testified, I would still have published the
results of these studies in social science journals,
even though the findings, had they been the reverse
of those we found, could have been used by prose-
cutors in the Southern states as evidence contrary
to the proposition advocated by the Legal Defense
Fund lawyers.
The basic question was this: Does the social
scientist have an obligation to publish or to refrain
from publishing material which might be damaging
to the political-social position he feels as a citizen?
I was fortunate in not having to face this dilemma
because all of the evidence we collected fell within
the domain of our social sentiments. The question
of suppression of evidence, therefore, never arose.
The dilemma would have been further compounded
by the fact that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
provided funds for the research. But the social
scientist should never feel subjugated to the source
of funds when engaging in scientific research.- The
right to release, to publish, and to display results is
a basic academic freedom and a research freedom
that should not be relinquished.
Vulnerability and the limitations of scientific
research are features well-recognized within the
scientific community. There are no scientific laws
in social science. The best and most rigorous em-
pirical research rests upon statements of probabil-
ity. Other scholars who examine the results, the
findings, descriptions, interpretations and explana-
tions of a body of research respond to these limita-
tions and vulnerabilities in ways that may be
muted by their own understanding of them. They
are faced with similar limitations in their own re-
search. However, under the conditions of testify-
ing in court, these vulnerabilities and limitations
may be subject to hypothetical questioning and the
sometimes abrasive interrogation of a lawyer whose
primary task is not to appreciate the problems of
science and treat them gently, but to deny the
1974]
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strength'of the assertions and to destroy the as-
sumption of scientificity.
After years of experience presenting evidence be-
fore various courts, I am now prepared for cross-
examination which does not address itself spe-
cifically to the same issues that I, as a scientist,
examined in my research. In my first exposure in
the Federal District Court in Little Rock, I was not
fully prepared for the style in which the Assistant
Attorney General of Arkansas examined me. I had
been prepared for the possibility of another statis-
tician being placed on the witness stand by the
Attorney General, but as John de Cani has indi-
cated, no statistical expert witness was ever offered
to contradict this evidence. Nor has any statisti-
cian, social scientist, or criminologist ever been of-
fered by opposing advocates to contradict or rein-
terpret my research data. Thus, instead of being
asked questions directly related to the scientific
limitations of the research, I was asked a series of
questions that, from my scientific perspective, had
no relationship to the thrust of the inquiry, or to
the reliability or validity of the findings.
I was asked under cross-examination if I had
ever been in Arkansas before my appearance as an
expert witness for the Legal Defense Fund. I re-
sponded in the negative. The Assistant Attorney
General used this response to imply that I did not
fully understand the social conditions or the litiga-
tion processes in Arkansas. It was further brought
out under cross-examination that Garland County,
in which Maxwell had been tried, was not included
in the survey sampling of Arkansas counties. The
state argued that failure to include Garland County
was a fatal error, that the generalized conclusions
drawn from the Arkansas rape-death penalty study
could not apply to the Maxwell case.
Based upon my own research, this conclusion
was absurd. We had taken a carefully drawn ran-
dom sample of counties in Arkansas, as well as in
the other ten Southern states, without attention to
the counties in which specific cases for litigation
may finally occur. Our primary interest had been
to determine whether there had been a customary,
institutionalized, systematic process of differential
sentencing to the death penalty based on race;
hence, the specific litigated cases were of no conse-
quence to our random selection. If we had drawn
our sample counties purposefully to pick counties
in which cases like Maxwell had occurred, we would
have destroyed the statistical randomness of the
selection of counties and would have also distorted
the character of the scientific inquiry. Yet, this
fact and this kind of reasoning had little impact on
either Assistant Attorney General Fletcher Jack-
son or judge J. Smith Henley.
The social scientist who becomes involved in
testifying and displaying research evidence must
also be prepared for opinions that contravene the
traditional scientific canons of response. For ex-
ample, Judge Henley accepted my conclusion
that sentencing patterns of Arkansas Negroes
convicted of raping white victims "could not be
due to the operation of the laws of chance." He
accepted the conclusion that a black convicted of
raping a white woman had about a 50 per cent
chance of receiving a death sentence, and that
any man convicted of raping a woman of his own
race stood only a 14 per cent chance. But judge
Henley thought the difference could be explained
on grounds other than race, and contended that
the imposition of the death sentence might be
due to some factor for which statistical analysis
had not been possible or presentable. He an-
nounced in his decision that the "variables which
Dr. Wolfgang considered are objective ... broad
in instances ... imprecise.... Discrimination
moreover is a highly subjective matter [and might
not] be detected by a statistical analysis....
Statistics are elusive things at best, and it is a
truism that almost anything can be proven by
them." 8 These are common assertions made by
persons who are not social scientists trained in
statistics. Yet, the social scientist who becomes
involved in testifying in this area must be pre-
pared for arguments and decisions that are political
or that reside in legal vicissitudes outside the
framework of social science inquiry and evidence.'
With respect to my experience on the witness
stand in the Maxwell trial, I can honestly say
that I never felt frustrated. I was well directed
under direct examination, and well prepared be-
forehand by the very capable lawyers of the Legal
Defense Fund. Nor have I ever felt abused or
treated offensively in court by unfriendly cross-
examiners. Unlike psychiatrists who testify as
expert witnesses in insanity cases, I have always
felt that both the opposing lawyers and the judges
were civil, and afforded me appropriate oppor-
tunities for expansion of my answers. I never had
to respond in a simple yes-or-no style. Moreover,
because of the appreciation and understanding of
8 257 F. Supp. 710 (E. D. Ark. 1966), cited by MxLTs-
NT, supra note 4, at 322.
For a history of the use of the research data, see
MxLrsNER, supra note 4, at 73-105.
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the role of the social scientist by the Legal Defense
Fund lawyers, I never felt that I had to suppress,
mute, or otherwise distort any of my findings or
any of the scientific inquiry that led to the evi-
dence I ultimately presented. In short, the role
conflicts that I felt initially and the dilemmas
that I anticipated were all smoothly resolved be-
cause the legal staff accepted the caution of lan-
guage and the style of the scientist. This fact is
perhaps one of the most important historical
lessons that can be of utility both to social scien-
tists and to their companion lawyers with whom
they work in future civil rights litigation.
The research design of social scientists who are
involved in litigation and as expert witnesses
should conform, as always, to the rules of scientific
methodology, without being prejudiced by the
underlying litigation purpose. That purpose may
be the original or basic reason for becoming in-
volved, and in that sense dearly reveals a value
judgment. Failure to abide by the known rules of
scientific inquiry can only damage the evidence,
as well as the presenter. The statistical techniques
of analysis, the methods of research, and 'the em-
phasis upon the traditional canons of reliability,
validity and objectivity should be observed if the
thrust of the scientificity of the testimony is to
be maintained with integrity. The null hypothesis
or other theoretical guides for the selection of
variables and data analysis are equally important
for maintaining a posture of a scientist and not
of an advocate. The acuity of the companion
lawyers should be sufficient for the social scientist
as a linguistic and institutionalized vehicle for the
transportation of his findings.
The social scientist should not try to convert
his design, his data, or his conclusions to conform
to the litigation process. There is no reason for
him to use statistical measures of significance and
techniques different from those used in any other
level of scientific inquiry. The language employed
to present evidence should be as precise and clear
and as devoid of jargon as the scientist is capable
of providing. The inductive process, including
serendipity, of obtaining insights from a review of
data should be described in testimony in the same
way it is communicated to the scientific commun-
ity. Conditional clauses should be employed de-
spite the fact that they are more vulnerable to
cross-examination. Such words and phrases as
"may,". "probable," "other things being equal,"
"holding constant certain variables," and "asso-
ciated" rather than "cause" are important verbal
accouterments of the probabilistic language of
science, and should not be neglected when pre-
senting evidence in court.
There may be some apprehension associated
with the fact that a court stenographer is recording
every word. There is a considerable difference
between speaking under those circumstances and
expounding sometimes unsure evidence before a
group of students in a seminar where cross-exam-
ination is not employed. Speculations, interpreta-
tions beyond secure data, and attempts to get
reactions to a new idea can be exciting features of
a seminar, but such forays are not meant for a
record upon which cross-examination is based.
Nevertheless, the scientist who does .testify, and
who is confident of his own research and .the in-
tegrity of his findings, need not fear the attack-.
Like the candidate in defense of his doctoral thesis,
the expert witness should be more fully informed
and more erudite about his material than an at-
torney who is questioning him critically. ,
The lawyer is informed about his case and the
legal issues at stake. He is ,not particularly inter-
ested in being in command. of the scientific mate-
rial. The expert and the lawyer use different skills
and languages. Their dialogue has oblique contact,
with the one using verbal assaults in an effort to
pierce the linguistic mail of the other. Unless the
social scientist is prepared to understand these
perspectives and to be assured of his own, rule,
unperturbed by the drama of the court and the
critical capacities of his cross-examiner, he: should
not participate in this kind of episode. Lawyers
should beware of those social scientists who are
only too willing to be expert witnesses on the basis
of their fervent feelings for the cause, at issue.
Unless such scientists have empirical evidentiary
material to buttress an argument, they will be
more of a burden than a blessing.
Gregory v. Litto= Systems, Inc. represented other
kinds of problems. Gregory was a black sheetmetal
worker who sought a job with Litton Systems,
Inc. in Los Angeles in 1968. He filled out the usual
application forms. When he returned a week later
to begin work, he was informed that he should- fill
out another form. The new form demanded in-
formation about whether the applicant had ever
been arrested, how often, and for what reasons.
Gregory filled out the form frankly, indicating that
he had been arrested fourteen times. There had
been no convictions, and most of the arrests had
been for trivial offenses, including failure to carry
his registration for selective service. Yet, because
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his record reflected fourteen arrests, Gregory was
deemed ineligible for hire. He contacted the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which
turned the case over to the law firm of Simon,
Sheridan, Murphy, Thornton and Medvene for
litigation.
I was asked by Edward Medvene to testify in
July, 1970, as a criminologist on behalf of Greg-
ory's claim. After learning the particulars of the
case, I agreed. I contended that, as a black, Greg-
ory had a higher probability of being inappropri-
ately arrested than a white, and that therefore
the notion of "substantial" arrest record as a basis
for deciding to employ or not employ was dis-
criminatory. In this case, I did not collect new
empirical research. Time permitted only co-ordina-
tion of existing material, some of which was anec-
dotal, but most of which was previously collected
empirical and statistical data. This was the basis
for my testimony that the use of arrest records
was improper because of the discriminatory char-
acter of official arrest records. I argued that blacks
are more likely to be entrapped in the network of
the criminal justice system than are whites, this
despite the sufficiency of evidence in individual
cases. I referred to what is known as "self-report-
ing" studies of "hidden delinquency and crime."
These studies, from the United States, England
and Scandinavia, show that in anonymous ques-
tionnaires or interviews there are no statistically
significant social class differences among persons
who admit having committed a variety of criminal
offenses. Ethnic and racial differences that are
traditionally recorded in official police arrest
records, showing that blacks in America are dis-
proportionately represented four times beyond
their "share" in the general population, are reduced
to insignificance in the hidden delinquency, self-
reported studies. Fortified by these findings, I
testified, with various documentation, that whites
admit having committed about as many offenses
as blacks, and that variations by social class, recog-
nizing that blacks are mostly represented in the
lower social class in the official police statistics,
virtually disappear in the self-reported studies.
The study by Chambliss and Nagasawa 0 was par-
ticularly useful because it referred to whites,
blacks, and Japanese and offered these same
conclusions.
'
0 See Chambliss and Nagasawa, On the Validity of
Official Statistics-A Comparative Study of White,
Black, and Japanese High School Boys, 6 J. REs.
CamE & DELINQUENCY 111 (1969).
The major dilemma I faced as a social scientist
in Gregory arose from my request for special com-
puter runs in Philadelphia and in St. Louis on the
attrition of cases, by race, from police arrest to
the preliminary hearing and presentation for trial.
My student assistants at the Center for Studies in
Criminology and Criminal Law quickly undertook
a special study of the Philadelphia cases to deter-
mine whether a greater number of blacks than
whites were arrested, and whether a greater num-
ber of blacks had their cases dismissed by the
magistrate at the preliminary hearing. I also asked
Nelson Heller, who was a researcher in the St.
Louis Police Department, where quick computer
analysis was available, to do a special run of the
same kinds of analysis.
The conclusion in both cities was that propor-
tionately no more blacks than whites had cases
dismissed at the preliminary hearing, and that
there was no statistical evidence to show that the
grounds of probable cause for arrest were different
for blacks and whites.
Not being able to present clear evidence of dis-
proportion from which inferences of discrimination
could be made, I tried to determine whether these
materials could be used in testimony. It was dear
to the lawyers that this small and inconclusive
research effort was of no benefit to them and should
not be presented. Evidence unsupportive of one's
case, however complete or segmental it may be,
has no function in the adversary game. Such evi-
dence may be useful in a scientific article, but if
one piece of evidence is contravened by other
evidence, it has no proper place in argument before
a court. Evidence from a scientific perspective may
be neutral or negative, and should be presented
in an essay that examines a given phenomenon,
even if that evidence is relatively weak, in order
to show the contrary position of more firm evi-
dence. But in court, evidence negative to one's
position is omitted. There is selectivity unlike
that which exists in science. If history were written
with such selectivity, if psychological, sociological
and other kinds of research were performed in an
adversary style, science would rush too quickly to
conclusions or be aborted in its efforts.
These differences must be recognized by scien-
tists who coalesce with trial and appellate lawyers.
This recognition should not be viewed as a capitu-
lation by the rules of science, but instead as a
filtering of the scientific rules through a set of
values that may be different, but which are equally
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powerful, useful and absolutely necessary in the
defense or prosecution of a position. The litigation
process has a different set of operating procedures
than does scientific inquiry. Scientific evidence is
judged within the context of legal rules of evi-
dence, especially doctrines of constitutionality,
that do not always coincide with the rubrics of
science in the manner in which they order knowl-
edge of empiric reality. Moreover, there is as wide
a range from soft to hard data, and of rigor and
sophistication of analysis in science as well as in
law. The preceptors of science must be alerted to
their own fallibilities and be prepared to accept
challenges outside their disciplines by others
trained in the parameters of law, the adequacy of
logic and the rigors of reasoning. It is in these
attributes that the scientist and the lawyer can
find firm meeting ground for their minds, and for
the exciting display of their separate talents and
training.
As the findings from social and behavioral
science become increasingly relevant to the resolu-
tion of critical legal issues,n as trial and constitu-
USee Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); G.
MvnnAL, THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DE-
mocRAcY (1962). Myrdal's An American Dilemma
(1944) is one of the important sociological studies re-
tional lawyers recognize the relevance of behavioral
science, and as statements of probability and in-
ferential statistics become more acceptable to
judicial decision making processes, the number of
cases employing this disciplinary mix should in-
crease. Legal education should reflect these changes
by introducing more behavioral science courses
and materials in law schools, and by appointing
social scientists to law school faculties. I also
urge social scientists to become involved in the
exciting and dramatic work of litigation with
lawyers.
Theories, assumptions, hypotheses, reliability
and validity are concepts that can be readily
transferred, without distortion of meaning, from
the scientific treatise to the courtroom. To satisfy
the scientist, the vehicle of that transferrence
must be through the capable articulation of com-
petent companion lawyers. judges should be urged
to understand the testimony of scientists,,not as a
language of faith nor of heresy, but as a discourse
of reason whose rules are sometimes as firm, some-
times as flexible, as those of criminal precedence
and procedure.
ferred to in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483, 495 n.11 (1954).
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